Daniel Farnham
I distinguish substantive egoism from formal egoism, and argue that the latter – understood along Stoic lines – shows how a moral theory can be appropriately other-regarding and at the same time meaningfully egoistic.
A
Hegelian Theory of Retribution
This is a development and defense of Jean Hampton’s theory of retribution along Hegelian lines suggested in her presentation of the theory.
Maybe
Virtue Really Is Necessary for Happiness
A response to some troublesome counterexamples against this central eudaimonist thesis.
An explanation of why efforts to explain self-conscious human agency in naturalistic terms are bound to fail. I use David Velleman’s theory as an example, but the argument applies to any attempt to locate human agency in a set of (efficient) causal relations.
The Uselessness of the Final End
I explain the subjective character of Aristotle’s final end and its role in practical reasoning, and defend his view from some contemporary criticisms.
The Intrinsic Worth of Persons
A collection of Jean Hampton’s essays developing her distinctive contractarian approach to moral and political philosophy.